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In order to have a better understanding of the process of and the prospects for
democratisation in China, there is a need to scrutinise the three kinds of political
organisation or 'parties' that have existed in China in recent years. The first is
the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is still determined to
monopolise political power in its own way after over fifty years in power, The
second includes the legally sanctioned 'democratic parties', although many
would argue that they are neither democratic, nor parties. The third is the oppo-
sition party or parties that individuals and groups have attempted to form in
recent years. There is no historical precedent for a communist party-state to
successfully grow into a democracy without a break in continuity. Nevertheless,
when democratic forces grow within a party and increasing domestic and inter-
national pressure comes from all directions, a peaceful transformation of a
Leninist party is not beyond imagination, as shown by the recent experience in
Poland and Hungary. It is both possible and desirable that a workable democ-
racy will come to China through a peaceful and rational interplay of top-down
political reform and bottom-up democratic movement. In the event that China
muddles through in its transition to democracy, those interested in the project
of democratisation and the political future of that country should watch very
closely both internal political changes of the CCP and the signs of local demo-
cratic movements in Chinese society.
This article is a tentative exploration of, if not speculation on, the current
trend of the party system in China, with a special focus on the provincial dimen-
sion. Social, economic and cultural diversity among China's provinces (and
other provincial-level units) in the reform era has been well documented. ISome
even go so far as to liken the dynamic of regionalism in China today with the
experience of China during the late Qjng and the early Republican periods, when
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a weakening centre was accompanied by the growing power _, regional leaders,
particularly from the economically stronger provinces.i Indeed, in identifying
agents for political change in contemporary China, it will be interesting to see
whether there are significant regional variations in the internal change of the
CCP and democratic movements.
The CCP
Over the twenty years of reform, the CCP has adjusted not only its goals and
policies away from traditional state socialism, but also, to a lesser extent, its
organisational structure and its relationship with the state and society. Although
it is by no means clear that all of these changes can be characterised as liberalis-
ation or democratisation, some of them are arguably conducive to democracy.
Most notable among these changes are the abandonment of the system of
lifelong tenure for cadres, the granting of greater scope for policy consultation
and debates, including wider participation in political affairs by individuals and
groups beyond the party-state bureaucracy, greater zones of indifference and
tolerance, the greater role of elections and people's congresses, greater emphasis
on legality, and greater recognition of human rights.!
These changes are of course not equally distributed among different localities
under communist rule in China. When battles are fought between conservatives
and reformers, moderates and radicals, and hard-liners and soft-liners, there are
quite different situations at different levels of the hierarchy and at different
localities. The perspective of examining China at the provincial level may shed
new light on our study of the possible transformation of the CCP from within.
Concretely, several areas deserve closer attention.
First, there has been change in the social base of the CCP. We all agree that
the general trend of communist recruitment in China since the 1980s has been
a shift away from workers and peasants, in favour of new social elites with higher
levels of education and sophisticated skills, or in Chinese terms, a trend to
emphasise 'expertise' over 'redness"? This kind of change of course has import-
ant implications for the nature of the CCP. What we also need to emphasise is
that in those provinces with a stronger tradition of communist revolution, such
as Shaanxi, Shanxi and]iangxi, political criteria and class background of workers
and peasants still carry great weight in party recruitment; whereas in those
provinces at the forefront of economic reform, such as Guangdong and Fujian,
more emphasis has been put on recruiting the emerging intellectual and business
elite. Again, in the process of reversing the trend after the Tiananmen Square
incident, it was those inland provinces with the strongest tradition of commu-
nist revolution that went furthest in restoring the importance of political
'redness' .10
Second, there has been change in the formation of local leadership. Previous
studies on China's provinces have identified provincial leadership as one of the
key factors contributing to the origins of economic reforms and shaping
economic outcomes in individual provinces. I I But studies on democratisation in
formal communist countries and elsewhere have also indicated that personnel
turnover, and generational change in particular, plays a vital role in the transition
to democracy.V Following the party line of 'four modernisations of cadres' -
namely 'zhishihua, zhuanyehua, nianqinghua, geminghua' ('better educated,
more professional, younger, and more revolutionary') - a campaign to upgrade
China's cadre force toward a meritocracy has swept China since the early 1980s.
But that does not mean that the same objective criteria for the selection, assign-
ment and promotion of cadres have been applied everywhere. The reality is that
When it gathers its own momentum, 'socialist reform' proves to be much more
demanding than communist parties initially anticipate.! Without exception,
every communist regime embarking on the project of reform has been forced' to
face the dilemma of transforming itself completely, voluntarily giving up its right
to exist, or being swept away by popular rebellions. Indeed, there are those who
predict an imminent institutional collapse of the CCP,4 and those who argue that
democratisation of the communist regime in China is little less than inevitable.'
For a moment let us assume that the communist regime in China has to
democratise if it wants to avoid collapse. From this perspective, the fact that the
CCP has so far survived without democratisation requires China experts to look
more carefully for signs of potential change from within the CCP. The CCP is,
to some extent rightly, proud of its achievement, comparing its privilege to
continue its rule over the world's most populous country with the disintegra-
tion of its 'brother parties' in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. On
the other hand, the CCP has also developed a sense of extreme insecurity, Even
Falungong can provoke it to launch a deadly serious national campaign coupled
with mass arrest. No current leaders of the CCP are capable of explaining away
the necessity for political reform. The secret weapon for the CCP to manage its
survival is definitely not to recycle stale phrases such as 'only the CCP can save
China' and 'history has chosen the CCP', but rather the party's amazing skills
of accommodation and adaptation, as well as oppression and manipulation.
At first glance, the CCP is hopeless. According to some, it deliberately rejects
vital feedback from society, excludes alternative voices (even from within its
ranks), and therefore blocks the breakthrough to democracy via responsive
adaptation." The party also simply rejects the 'institutional guarantees' long
regarded by many as essential for a transition to democracy, such as freedom to
form and join organisations, freedom of expression, alternative sources of
information, and the right of political leaders to openly compete for support.'
Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that some positive changes have taken place
within the CCP during the process of reform. At least there is little doubt that
the CCP will not survive as a traditional monolithic Leninist party, organisa-
tionally or spatially, in spite of its rhetorical emphasis on unity and stability.
Actually, it is precisely internal diversity, if not divisions, that allows the party
to survive in an adverse environment, by applying alternate strategies of oppres-
sion and accommodation, manipulation and adaptation, according to different
circumstances.
HUlll UIl\: iocauty to another emphasis is very different among these four criteria.
And, perhaps more importantly, interpretation of the mean; )f'revolution-
ary' differs greatly in different provinces, variously referring to loyalty to the
party and orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, zeal in fighting
against bourgeois liberalism and hostile forces, or better service to social and
economic development. The end result is that the composition of the cadre force
varies, with some cadres more open-minded in some localities than in others.
Local leadership in those provinces more open to the outside world, such as
Guangdong and Fujian, has been very fast in acquiring the skills to adapt itself
to the new social and economic demands of its constituency. What is surprising
is that we have not seen any democratic reformers at the provincial level (except
Xu Jiatun in Jiangsu, who later held a unique position in Hong Kong and
escaped to the West after the June 4th incidents), although we have seen many
provincial leaders, such as Ren Zhongyi and Xiang Nan, with a new vision of
economic reform and development. 13
Third, there has been a degree of separation of the party from the state (dan-
gzheng ftnkai). On the one hand, although separating the party from the
government has been on the agenda of the CCP since the emergence of Den gist
leadership in the late 1970s, not much has been done in renovating the obsolete
party-state institutions in China. On the other hand, changes in the international
environment and domestic socioeconomic environment have posed an increas-
ingly serious challenge for the Chinese communist regime, which is forced to
make up for its institutional deficiencies through some measure of functional
separation between the party and the government. Perhaps the political risk is
too big for the current leadership to contemplate a fundamental change in
party / state relations. 'After the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union', observed a researcher, 'the last thing that the
CCP leaders wanted was the emergence of an independent organisational force,
mili tary or civilian.' 14However, the structural corruption and inefficiency of the
communist bureaucracy have become so serious, and the establishment of a com-
petent civil service is so essential to economic modernisation, that, when
assuming his position as premier in March 1998, Zhu Rongji launched the
'seventh revolution' - yet another in a series of 'revolutions' to restructure the
Chinese government. IS Restrained by its insistence on party leadership, the CCP
has not yet found a viable solution to the tensions between the party boss and
the administrative head at every level of the bureaucracy. Under the current
arrangement of dual emphasis - where the party boss puts emphasis on his or
her 'leadership' and the administrative head on his or her 'responsibility' -
tension appears to be inevitable. In recent years at the provincial level, we have
seen fierce personal conflicts between Rui Xingwen and Jiang Zemin in
Shanghai, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong in Beijing, Tang Shaowen and Nie Bichu
in Tianjin, Yang Rudai and Zhao Haoruo in Sichuan, Hou Zongbin and Li
Changchun in Henan, Deng Hongxun and LiuJiangfeng in Hainan, and Wang
Maolin and Hu Fuguo in Shanxi. Although we do not know to what extent their
conflicts are structural and to what extent personal, it is obvious that economic
reform so far has ere-red new ambiguities, called into question the old-style
party leadership, and .sed the accumulation of demands for institutional inno-
vations. The CCP has not yet contemplated what will be left for the party if the
government runs the country according to the constitution and other laws made
by the people's congress. It is left to both the party and the state bureaucracy at
each level to find out the proper demarcations between their respective spheres
of influence. There are indications that in some provinces - Guangdong and
Hainan, for example - one definite innovation has been made by establishing a
'system of public servants', which is a big step in making the civil service a
neutral regulator.
'Democratic parties' and mass organisations
'The system of multiparty cooperation under the leadership of the Communist
Party' has been praised by the CCP as a major advantage of its self-styled 'social-
ist system', a view rarely shared by anyone outside China. The CCP pretends to
believe that, in running the country, it is cooperating closely with eight other
'democ.ratic parties', namely the Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang,
the Chinese Democratic League, the Association for Construction of Democ-
racy, the Association for Promotion of Democracy, the Chinese Democratic
Party of Workers and Peasants, the Chinese Party for Achievement of Justice
(exclusively recruiting patriotic, returned overseas Chinese), the Third of
September Society (in commemoration of victory in the War of Resistance
against Japan on 3 September 1945), and the Alliance for Autonomy and
Democracy of Taiwan. However, even to most members of the CCP and these
'democratic parties', these minor parties are nothing but 'political flower vases'
of the CCP.
To be fair, the name 'democratic parties' was originally quite meaningful, not
so much because most of these parties had the word 'democracy' in their names,
but because these parties rallied with the CCP to fight for a genuine democratic
cause against the Nationalist dictatorship. When the People's Republic was first
founded, these parties were rewarded with real political power, often more than
they expected. At the first People's Political Consultative Conference (the then-
functional parliament in China), held in September 1949, members of the
'democratic parties' and public figures without party affiliation took 56 per cent
of the seats. They also took 31 of the 63 seats of the first Central Committee of
the People's Government, including 3 of the 6 vice-chairmanships, 2 of the 4
vice-premierships, 11 of the 24 State Council memberships, and 49 of the 109
min~ster and deputy minister positions. By 1956, the membership of these
parties had grown to 100,000.16 Everything changed in 1957 when the best
elements of these parties were purged (along with their democratic aspirations)
by the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Under the pressure of the Red Guards these
parties disbanded themselves in August 1966, and did not resume their activities
until 1978.
Ll ~JlUU1U ue noted that tor a variety of reasons these parties do have some
appeal among Chinese intellectuals and have succeeded in recr "ing thousands
of young intellectuals in the reform era. After the June 4th Ti••••anmen Square
incident, in order to repair the damage done by the crackdown and overcome its
legitimacy crisis, the CCP made some concessions to these minor parties, as
reflected in the 'Opinions of the Central Committee of the CCP Regarding
Preservation and Improvement of the System of Multiparty Cooperation under
the Leadership of the Communist Party and the System of Political Con-
sultation', issued in late 1989. This document laid down the principles: that an
annual conference would be organised for both leaders of the 'democratic
parties' and public figures without party affiliation to voice their opinions before
major policies are made by the Central Committee of the CCP; that a forum
should be organised once every two months for the CCP and the 'democratic
parties' to exchange their opinions on major policy issues; that major leaders of
the CCP should constantly seek opinions from the leaders of the 'democratic
parties' and the public figures without party affiliation; that the 'democratic
parties' would supervise the enforcement of the Constitution and other laws and
regulations, the implementation of plans for economic and social development,
and the performance of public servants; and that the proportion of representa-
tives of the 'democratic parties' would be increased in people's congresses and
the Political Consultative Conference, as well as at all levels of government
including the judiciary. Many intellectuals who felt too embarrassed to join the
CCP after the June 4th incident have instead joined these 'democratic parties'
to realise their political ambitions. In 1997, the appointment of members of the
'democratic parties' to important government positions included seven deputy
presidents of the state and deputy chairmen of the National People's Congress.
At the local level, 39 deputy governors, assistant governors, deputy mayors and
assistant mayors, 171 deputy mayors and assistant mayors of deputy prefectural
rank, 181 bureau heads or deputy bureau heads, and 6,274 section heads or
deputy section heads were appointed.F Again it appears that the 'democratic
parties' are playing more active roles in provinces and cities more open to the
outside world, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang,
where bolder appointments have been made for non-communists to head the
administration of state firms, universities and administrative units. It is also
worth noting that the influence of each of these 'democratic parties' is also
conditioned by its historical and social base in different localities, as shown by
the fact that the Chinese Democratic League is relatively stronger in Shanghai,
the traditional stronghold of that party, and the Chinese Party for Achievement
of Justice is more influential in Guangdong and Fujian, native places for most
overseas Chinese.
Apart from these 'democratic parties', there are thousands of mass organis-
ations in China. By the end of 1992, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
had 610,000 branches at the enterprise level and 3,000 organisations at provin-
cial, prefectural, city and county levels; the All China Women's Federation had
more than one million organisations at various levels; and the Chinese Youth
League had 2.7 million branches and more than 3,000 organisations at provin-
cial, prefectural, city an iunty levels. Furthermore, by September 1995, there
were more than 1,800 national associations and more than 200,000 local associ-
ations of a professional, social and political nature in China.l" The June 4th
crackdown on autonomous associations of students, workers and intellectuals
clearly indicates that these 'mass organisations' are something less than the
autonomous social organisations constituting 'civil society' in the West. As a
matter of fact, like the 'democratic parties', the 'mass organisations' continue to
be funded and directly controlled and run by the party-state. Even those associ-
ations 'run by the people' are required to affiliate with a unit of the party-state.
However, there are also clear indications that these 'mass organisations' and
associations play increasingly important roles in defending and advancing the
interests of their constituencies, simply because they have become more auton-
omous financially in the recent government reform process. Of course, the
degree of 'autonomy' and the roles played by the 'mass organisations' vary from
one province to another, as the political culture, the financial constraints, and
the government-streamlining imperative to encourage the 'autonomy' of the
'mass organisations' also vary greatly among provinces.
At least partly due to the active role played by the 'democratic parties' and
'mass organisations', recent years have witnessed a remarkable change in voting
behaviour in the people's congresses and political consultative conferences, with
substantial abstentions and dissenting votes - a long way from the days of
'rubber stamp' voting, especially at the provincial and lower levels. The provin-
cial people's congress in Zhejiang even voted the Governor Ge Hongsheng (the
only candidate nominated by the central Organisation Department of the CCP)
out of office in January 1993.19 Even at the central level, dissenting voices from
the 'democratic parties' have become so salient that in the last two years Li
Ruihuan, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-
ference, has repeatedly urged the members of the Conference 'to perform duties
but not to act in excess of authority; to help but not to create troubles; and to be
realistic rather than superficial' (jinzhi bu yuetsei, bangmang bu tianluan, qieshi bu
biaomian).20 New developments in this regard remind us of the late Qjng
experience when a constitutional movement in the provinces led to the estab-
lishment of the first Parliament in China, and the experience of the Republican
period when local elites played a very important role in local as well as national
politics.
Towards opposition parties
With some qualifications, a genuine political opposition in the history of the
People's Republic of China can be dated back to the Democracy Wall Movement
from 1978 to 1979.21 It has become a habit for the CCP to label anticommunist
activities of any scale as 'having a program, conspiracy and organisation' (you
gangling; you yumou, you zuzhi). However, the fatal weakness of the democratic
movement in China, from the Democracy Wall in 1978 to the Beijing Spring in
1989, is exactly the lack of a coherent organisation and a po" al program.F
Most studies on the democratic movement have focused till Beijing, leaving
out activities elsewhere. The Democracy Wall Movement was a nationwide
movement, with centres outside Beijing, each usually with at least one unofficial
or underground journal as an outlet for their opinions. Apart from Siiou Luntan
(April 5th Forum) and Tansuo (Exploration) in Beijing, the most notable journals
elsewhere included Remin zhi lu (People's Road) and Renmin zhi sheng (Voice of
the People) in Guangzhou, Minzhu zhi sheng (Voice of Democracy) and Zeren
(Duty) in Shanghai, Qjmeng (Enlightenment) in Guiyang and Fengfan (Boat's
Saif) in Taiyuan.P
The student demonstrations for democracy and freedom in December 1986
did not even start in Beijing, but in Hefei, due to the personal influence of Fang
Lizhi, who was vice-president of the Chinese University of Science and Tech-
nology located in Hefei. The demonstrations then quickly spread to Shanghai,
Beijing, Wuhan, Guangzhou and other major cities.
As for the pro-democracy protest movement in 1989, while the themes were
set by organisers in the capital and efficient mass media allowed localities across
China to follow the pattern of demonstrations in Beijing, the movement wit-
nessed some significant regional differences in terms of demands, intensity,
style, tactics and other aspects. The provincial dimension of the Beijing Spring
was partly picked up by The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the
Provinces, edited by Jonathan Unger. Accounts in this volume show that the
protest movement was mild in its tactics and demands in the southern coastal
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, but violent in the interior provinces of
Shaanxi and Hunan. It might not be a coincidence, as observed by Unger, that
the movement was relatively mild in provinces that had been favoured by the
reform process and had reaped the lion's share of benefits from the economic
boom, and relatively violent in provinces that had been somehow left out of the
economic reform and development of the 1980s.24
From the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978 to student demonstrations in
1986 through to the Beijing Spring in 1989, there were of course various auton-
omous groups involved and linking up with each other, forming communication
networks and disseminating information. Surprisingly, the attempt to organise
a political party was none the less not made until 1998. Partly encouraged by
Jiang Zemin's unusual talk on democracy at the 15th Congress of the CCP in
1997 and the communist regime's unusual move to sign the major international
documents on human rights, including The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and partly frustrated with the slow pace of democratisation in
China, some democracy activists in China suddenly decided to officially
organise the China Democracy Party in late 1998.
The sudden rise and fall of the China Democracy Party in late 1998 has
every reason to intrigue those concerned with the provincial dimension of
political development in China. Initial discussions about forming the China
Democracy Party took place among democratic activists in June 1998. Then in
August-September, applications for official registration of the party were
lodged by local demo y activists in many cities and provinces, including
Helongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Hubei, Sichuan, Shanghai
and Beijing. The responses from local authorities varied. In Beijing and
Shanghai, democratic activists met immediate arrest; in Zhejiang they were
detained, but released soon after; in Hubei their application was accepted for
consideration; and in Shandong they were asked to prepare a fuller application
with personal details of the leaders and proof of party funds of at least 50,000
yuan, a membership of 50 people or more, and a party office.25 A cautious
optimism was in the air that after fifty years of communist rule the political
tolerance for a genuine democratic party might come to China at long last.
Unfortunately, a legalised political opposition proved to be too much for the
central CCP leadership. On 21-22 December 1998, with decisions made at the
central level, the local authorities handed down lengthy prison sentences to three
political activists who had tried to register the China Democracy Party in oppo-
sition to the CCP: 13 years for Xu Wenli in Beijing, 12 years for Qjn Yongmin
in Wuhan, and 11 years for Wang Youcai in Hangzhou, each for the crime of sub-
version.I" According to one source, the Chinese authorities took that resolute
measure to prevent the formation of the China Democracy Party as a national
organisation, as on 10 November 1998 the Zhejiang branch had been entrusted
to sponsor a conference for the national preparatory committee involving
political dissidents from twelve provinces and cities - Helongjiang, Jilin,
Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan,
Sichuan and Guizhou.l? The arrests led to an unprecedented protest by several
hundred people outside the Intermediate People's Court in Hangzhou on 17
December 1998, and a relay hunger strike for 100 days by 214 political dissidents
from 15 provinces and cities between 24 December 1998 and 11January 1999.28
Except for the factor of personalities, we know little about why the democratic
movement was more active in some localities than others.
Conclusion
It might be naive to expect an immediate realisation of a multi-party system in
China, but it is foolish to imagine the maintenance of one-party rule long beyond
the political life of the first-generation revolutionaries and their appointed suc-
cessors. While neither transformation of the 'democratic parties' into genuine
political parties nor legalisation of political opposition is yet in sight, the CCP,
fully aware of the fact that erosion of its legitimacy has reached an alarming level,
is desperately searching for a viable way to get out of its predicament. Seemingly
every small move made by the CCP in political liberalisation in the reform era
was immediately picked up by the 'democratic parties' and democracy activists,
who more often than not attempted a subtle twisting of what had been allowed
by the party, to advance their cause.
Surprisingly, political modernisation towards multi-party democracy in
L.hma remains to be effectively blocked by the party-state, not only at the
national level but also at local levels. The party-state r inues to play the
winner-takes-all game, to ban any political opposition, to .uonopoiise political
organisations, and to ensure political uniformity throughout the country.
However, given the significant diversity in social, economic and cultural
developments among China's provinces, some of which are more conducive to
democratisation than others due to higher levels of economic development, the
emergence of stronger liberal forces and more liberal tendencies in political
culture, incremental institutional developments and organisational changes
regarding the parties of all colours at provincial and lower levels may be no
trifling matter in the political transformation of that country, which, according
to Lucian Pye, has a great tradition of muddling through with a host of contra-
dicrions.-?
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The Chinese leadership has been aware that the policy of economic reform and
opening up to the outside world since 1979 has led to growing regional differ-
ences. According to Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang and Kang Xiaoguang,
China's regional differences were more serious than those of the former
Yugoslavia and India, both of which were in the front ranks among countries
with significant regional differences. In 1993, the overall regional per capita
GDP differential coefficient in China amounted to 70.9 per cent, while that in
the former Yugoslavia in 1988 was 53.6 per cent, and in India in 1980 it was 36.4
per cent. On a weighted basis, adjusting to regional population figures, the
coefficient in China in 1991 was 46.3 per cent, still higher than the historical
peaks of most developed countries - for example, 42.4 per cent in Norway in
1939,41 per cent in the United States in 1932, and 38.4 per cent in Italy in 1952.
Excessive regional disparities obviously damage the interests of the less devel-
oped regions. They will also result in higher rates of inflation and unemploy-
ment. They are even more unpalatable in a socialist country, which takes pride
in reducing the gap between the rich and the P9or. Serious regional disparities
bring social and political instability and may even generate demands for regional
autonomy. This is an important concern for Chinese leaders who understand
that, in a huge country like China, central-regional relations must always be
handled with care. It is significant that China still adopts a unitary system of
government, highly exceptional for its size.
ISSN 1326-7612 printl 1476-7 104 online/02i010085-18 © 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOl: 10.1080/13267610220144641
